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In a simple model of social interaction I analyze the welfare eﬀects of
positive (prescriptive) and negative (proscriptive) social norms, together
with the private incentives for their enactment. I ﬁnd that imposing no
law is socially optimal when individual actions have no signiﬁcant exter-
nalities, while bans become socially optimal as the externalities increase.
Prescriptions are generally the worst choice, but when the externalities
involved are very high. However, in the political arena support is rarely
won for non intervention or for a ban, since an alternative majority will
generally be found in favor of some prescription. This remains true even
when strategic voting is considered, and provides an argument for the idea
that a liberal state cannot be liberally enforced by rational voters.
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11 Introduction
People stay together because they can beneﬁt from mutual interaction. Of
course, they can also suﬀer from these interactions. However, what is important
for the analysis conducted below is that, living in societies, they can hardly
escape to interact with each other. No matter how we behave, we aﬀect other
people’s well being, and others aﬀect us.
Given interaction, people have always tried to act in such a way to condi-
tion others’ behavior, and make it less oﬀensive, or more beneﬁcial. Laws are
explicitly aimed at this.
A problem then arises on how individual action should be regulated. Is it
better to impose a behavior that is regarded as beneﬁcial by most members
of a community or ban a behavior that is considered harmful? When, on the
other hand, should be preferred not to intervene at all, and let individuals
behave as they like? These questions motivate the ﬁrst part of the paper,
where a normative analysis of three diﬀerent forms of policies – no intervention,
bans, and prescriptions – imposing diﬀerent constraints on individual behavior
is presented. The null option, which we might as well call natural order, or
anarchy, means that no constraints at all are imposed on individual behavior.
Bans refer to a prohibition to act in some speciﬁc way, which leaves individuals
the choice between other alternatives. As such, they recall a liberal approach
to regulation. Prescriptions are obligations to follow a speciﬁc behavior, and
maintain a ﬂavor of socialism.
The remaining of the paper confronts the answers to the questions above
with what happens when people are allowed to vote. Are private incentives
such that the social welfare is maximized? Or, conversely, are we doomed to
implement laws that are even worse than the natural order?
I show that on average prescriptions are the optimal policy only when in-
2dividual actions have very strong (positive or negative) externalities. Bans are
likely to be optimal when the externalities are medium to strong, while anarchy
is better when externalities are low to medium. These statements are stochas-
tic because which policy is actually the best, from an utilitarian perspective,
depends on the distribution of individual preferences.
However, private incentives are such that a long-lasting consensus for non-
intervention or for a ban is very rarely found, and prescriptions are agreed upon
instead, even when this is not optimal.
The intuition is as follows. Limiting individual freedom comes always at a
cost in terms of the utility of the speciﬁc individuals being constrained, and
thus – ceteris paribus – also in terms of aggregate utility. If few people are
harmed by a speciﬁc action, as is the case when the action produces a low
level of externalities, the best policy is not to intervene. As the external eﬀects
increase, a ban on that action is generally to be preferred to an obligation to
play some other action because it leaves more choices open, some of which might
give a higher utility not only to those who are acting but also to other people in
the society, with respect to the obligation to play one speciﬁc alternative. The
optimality of prescriptions comes out of a speciﬁc assumption of the model,
namely that the payoﬀs are symmetric: if one action produces a lot of harm
to someone, there must be some other action that gives him/her a lot of good
— stated diﬀerently, an individual cannot be aﬀected by negative externalities
only. In this case, if the level of externalities is high enough it becomes optimal
to force individuals to play the action that is preferred by most of the people,
irrespective of any other consideration. What is most interesting however is that
if individuals are asked to vote among all diﬀerent policy options and we assume
that they vote sincerely, they would always support a prescription. This is true
irrespective of the assumption of symmetric preferences, since they are always
3better oﬀ if their most preferred choice is established by law: put diﬀerently,
everyone would prefer to be voted as a dictator.
As the relative minority realizes that a disliked prescription is going to be
enacted, incentives for strategic voting arise. Some new majority might coor-
dinate on voting a diﬀerent prescription, or a ban. By considering a simple
mechanism of probabilistic voting I show that non-intervention or limited inter-
vention can be (strategically) supported only if the number of voters is limited,
and only for some speciﬁc distribution of preferences in the society. As the size
of the population increases, the eﬀect of any individual vote becomes almost
negligible and the ability for the relative minority to achieve coordination e.g.
on a ban decreases: accordingly, the incentives for strategic voting become more
limited, and the outcome converges to the non-strategic one: only prescriptions
win support.
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 describes how this paper relates
to the literature; section 3 describes the model; section 4 provides a normative
analysis by comparing bans and prescriptions with respect to an utilitarian view
of social welfare; section 5 analyzes what happens with binary competition, i.e.
when competing policies are evaluated only pairwise; section 6 shows that when
the diﬀerent policies are jointly evaluated non-strategic voting always leads to
the implementation of prescriptions, describes the mechanism of strategic voting
considered and shows that even with strategic voting prescriptions remain the
most likely outcome. Section 7 concludes.
2 The literature
This paper relates to two diﬀerent strands of the literature: the one on the
role of the law, liberalism and institutional design and the one on social choices
and voting mechanisms, in particular with respect to the properties of majority
4ruling.
The Austrian and libertarian traditions have long stressed the virtues of
minimal state intervention [von Hayek, 1960, Nozick, 1974]. However, their
arguments rely mainly on a philosophical approach: liberty is good for its own
sake, and individual freedom, but for a few limitations, is considered intangible.
Freedom is a natural right, deriving ultimately either from some self-evident
human trait or directly from God; it is never to be intended as a creation of
human societies or a grant of governments. As such it cannot be traded against
some other value and evaluated with respect to a somehow deﬁned concept of
social welfare.
Social contract theorists such as Hobbes, Locke or Rousseau all believed
in a natural law and in natural rights. In this view the role of the state, to
which speciﬁc monopoly powers are consensually transferred, is only to protect
individuals from each other through the legitimate use of physical force.
This approach is at the heart of the English and American legal traditions,
the principles of natural law being expressed, explicitly or implicitly, in such
documents as the Magna Charta and the United States Declaration of Indepen-
dence:
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created
equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalien-
able Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of
Happiness. (The Unanimous Declaration of the Thirteen United
States of America, 1776)
Followers of these traditions share a concept of negative liberty [Berlin, 1958],
which refers to an individual’s freedom from being subjected to the authority
of others. In this negative sense one is considered to be free to the extent to
which no person interferes with his or her activity:
5a free man is he that [...] is not hindered to do what he hath the
will to do. (Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ch. 21, 1651)
In the terms of the model proposed here, this view inclines either to sup-
porting no government intervention at all, or negative obligations as expressed
by bans on speciﬁc harmful actions.
On the contrary, supporters of positive liberty, interpreted as the freedom to
achieve certain ends, might accept that the state has to force some behaviors
upon people in order to make those ends at hands. Hence they would not object
in principle to policies contemplating positive obligations, as the prescriptions
considered in the model. 1
Note that the positive and negative approach to social norms have a parallel
with a positive and negative approach to moral norms, as exempliﬁed by the
two golden rules of Judaism (“don’t do others what you don’t like them do unto
you”) and Christianity (“do others what you would like them do unto you”). 2
The present paper creates a bridge between this philosophical approach and
the political economy literature, providing an utilitarian argument in favor of
a more liberal state 3. However, it also raises some doubts that such a liberal
state might be agreed upon by means of a democratic voting process 4, and
indeed helps explaining why excessive regulation is often complained.
The paper is also related to the new institutional economics (NIE) literature
[Williamson, 2000], which has speciﬁcally focused on the analytical investiga-
tion of diﬀerent institutional frameworks. However, the main concern of NIE
has been the deﬁnition and enforcement of property rights, mainly at what
1An echo of the distinction between a positive and a negative view of liberty can be found
in the distinction between a process aspect and an opportunity aspect of liberty [Sen, 1999].
2The implications of these two norms for social welfare has been investigated in [Richiardi,
2006], in a model that is a particular case of the one presented here.
3the utilitarian tradition in welfare economics, which dates back to the work of [Bentham,
1789], [Edgeworth, 1881], [Marshall, 1890] and [Pigou, 1920], allows for making judgments
over social interest by comparing individual utilities
4which rules out the possibility of interpersonal comparisons: one head, one vote
6Williamson calls level 3, i.e. the level of governance.
The present paper adds to this literature by stressing the importance of an-
alyzing diﬀerent forms of legislative action. Speciﬁc institutional arrangements
at level 2, the level of constitutions and general laws deﬁning the rules of the
game, might prove eﬀective in binding further legislative choices thus allowing
better types of laws to be implemented at lower tiers. 5
From yet another perspective, and complementary to the philosophical liter-
ature stressing that individual freedom should not be traded in order to achieve
some supposedly better social outcome, Sen’s impossibility theorem [Sen, 1970]
proves that it is not possible to have a social decision function that satisﬁes at
the same time liberalism 6 and Pareto optimality 7. Rather then dispensing
with the requirement of liberalism, Sen concluded that economists should not
insist too much on Pareto eﬃciency, which however is the only welfare criterion
remaining when interpersonal comparisons of utilities are ruled out.
Sen’s approach is axiomatic. Instead, I look at the private incentives to vote,
without imposing any requirement on the outcome. What I show is that, unless
they are speciﬁcally safeguarded by some higher order law as a constitution,
liberal values are at risk to be sacriﬁced to individual self-interest, empowered
by the dictatorship of the majority. The democratic process produces a result
that is Pareto optimal (any change in the law would harm someone) but is not
liberal and, in many cases, not eﬃcient from an utilitarian perspective.
Other unpleasant properties of majority ruling were already recognized in
the 18th century by the Marquis of Condorcet [Condorcet, 1785], who stressed
the problem of ﬁnding a stable outcome under the majority rule by showing how
5From a political economy perspective [Persson and Tabellini, 2003] investigate the empiri-
cal evidence of the economic eﬀects of constitutions. Here I totally abstract from the economic
incentives diﬀerent policies might induce, and look only at individual preferences over those
policies.
6interpreted as allowing each individual to be decisive over at least some alternatives
7plus the conditions of unrestricted domain
7pairwise voting (binary agenda) over policy alternatives may fail to produce an
overall winner. 8
Ways out of the Condorcet paradox involve restricting preferences 9, dispens-
ing with the so-called open agenda assumption 10 or dropping the assumption
of pairwise comparison.
However, both agenda manipulation and non-pairwise policy evaluation pro-
vide strong incentives for strategic voting, i.e. non-sincere preference revelation.
Indeed, [Gibbard, 1973] and [Satterthwaite, 1975] show that any democratic
decision-making mechanism involving more than two options, including the ma-
jority rule, provides incentives for strategic voting. 11
Strategic voting poses a problem because it might lead to diﬀerent outcomes
depending on how individual behavior is modeled, and in particular on the
speciﬁc assumptions on how expectations are formed.
Strategic voting is indeed common in many real world situations. For in-
stance, in ﬁrst-past-the-post elections a left-wing voter may vote for a popular
moderate candidate over an unpopular leftist candidate in order to help defeat
a strong right-wing candidate 12. In those proportional representation systems
that include a minimum percentage of votes that a party must achieve to receive
any seats, people might vote strategically for a minor party to prevent it from
dropping below that percentage, which would make the votes it does receive use-
8The Condorcet paradox is an exempliﬁcation of the famous Arrow’s impossibility theorem
[Arrow, 1950], and more in general of the diﬃculties in formulating social preferences on a
narrow informational base, which rules out interpersonal comparisons.
9see [Black, 1948], [Gans and Smart, 1996] and [Rothstein, 1990] for one-dimensional poli-
cies; [Grandmont, 1978], [Plott, 1967], [Davis et al., 1972] and [Hinich et al., 1972] for the
multi-dimensional case
10for instance by imposing a limited number of pairwise votes
11The two theorems state that any voting method which is completely strategy-free must be
either dictatorial or non-deterministic. Non-determinism is exempliﬁed by the random ballot
voting method, which assigns the outcome after looking at a single vote randomly selected.
The random ballot method may of course result in diﬀerent choices being selected if applied
multiple times to the same set of ballots.
12this is the basis for the Duverger’s law [Duverger, 1972], suggesting that ﬁrst-past-the-post
election systems generally leads to two-party systems
8less for the larger political camp that party belongs to. Finally, strategic voting
is even more an issue when only a few players are involved, as in corporate
boards, ministry councils, etc.
A widely used approach to deal with strategic voting in the political econ-
omy literature is to consider probabilistic voting [Hinich, 1977], [Coughlin and
Nitzan, 1981], [Ledyard, 1981], [Ledyard, 1984]. Probabilistic models assume
that individuals assign probabilities to the voting behavior of other people.
In this paper I adopt a similar approach. However, probabilistic voting
models generally consider uncertainty on the part of the candidates (who have
to choose their electoral platform), for instance because some individuals might
vote sincerely due to the force of ideology, or some others might not even dare to
turn out to the ballot. In the model I propose here there are no candidates or,
put diﬀerently, the electoral platforms are exogenously given and only voters’
behavior is modeled. As is usual in models of voting behavior, I make the
assumption of common knowledge of the electoral situation. 13 However, in my
model voters learn about the popularity of the competing policy alternatives,
through repeated interactions. Individuals weight the payoﬀs they get under
each policy by the probability of that policy being enacted, and they estimate
this probability adaptively by looking at the share of the vote the same policy
has attracted in the last competition. They ﬁnally vote for the option to which
they attach the highest expected payoﬀ. The implications of such a mechanism,
which similarly to [Myatt, 2007] is able to account for the fact that the trailing
challenger suﬀers only incomplete strategic desertion, are investigated by means
of an agent-based simulation model [Tesfatsion, 2006]. 14
The assumption of repeated interaction is of course inadequate for most
13A model which assumes that voters can only observe a private signal about the popularity
of competing candidates is [Myatt, 2007].
14From a methodological point of view, the application of computer simulations to the
analysis of voting outcomes with strategic behavior was pioneered by [Tullock and Campbell,
1970], who looked at cycles in small committees.
9real situations 15. However, it makes sense here because I’m only interested
in the equilibrium outcome. Out-of-equilibrium electoral rounds should then
be thought of as an “as if” modeling device to account for individual learning.
Moreover, it should be remembered that I do not intend to present here a
complete new theory of strategic voting, but rather a simple mechanism to test
if the implications of my model are robust to strategic behavior.
3 The model
With the aim to keep the model minimal, I consider only three alternatives, over
which individuals have diﬀerent preferences. Restricting our attention to three
options at a time is a reasonable simpliﬁcation, which — as it will be shown
below — preserves most of the interesting dynamics inherent in the social choice.
In a model with just two alternatives there would be no diﬀerence between
banning one option and imposing the other. On the other hand, in a model
with more than three options additional policies become possible, like banning
more than one alternative or restricting individual choice among a small set
of alternatives. These policies however look like a half-way between a pure
negative (forbidding one and only one action) and a pure positive (imposing
one and only one action) obligation. It can therefore be expected that their
properties would be a mixture between the properties of pure negative and pure
positive obligations analyzed below.
The three actions are labeled A, B and C. The distribution P of individual
preferences over these actions can be summarized by the 6-tuple {p1,··· ,p6},
each number representing the fraction of the population sharing the same com-
bination of the most preferred and the least preferred action (table 1).
15although it can be argued that it might work for countries like e.g. Italy, with 18 general
elections, including those for the European Parliament but excluding referendums, between
1946 and 2006, or Israel, with 17 general elections between 1949 and 2006, or Switzerland,
10Type Most preferred Least preferred Share
1 A B p1
2 A C p2
3 B A p3
4 B C p4
5 C A p5
6 C B p6
Table 1: Distribution of preferences
Individual utility is aﬀected by own actions and by the actions played by
whom the individual is interacting with. Own actions aﬀect n ∈ [0,N] other
people, randomly drawn from a population of size N.
Both individual utility and aggregate welfare are deﬁned only in terms of
the expected (individual or total) payoﬀ from one random interaction, π.
Individuals get a payoﬀ of α when they play what they like and a payoﬀ of
−α when they are forced to play what they don’t like. They get 0 when they
play their second choice. Moreover, they cause a payoﬀ of β to each passive
opponent should s/he approve what they have done, and a payoﬀ of −β should
s/he disapprove. They cause a payoﬀ of 0 if the opponent ranks the action as
his/her second choice.
Individual preferences are private information, and communication before
interaction is not possible. This excludes the possibility of contracting out ` a la
Coase [Coase, 1960] the externality problem.
There is no political intermediation. Individuals can ask for a vote on any
combination of competing policy options, which include both prescriptions and
proscriptions. If no majority is reached, no obligation is passed. People are
allowed to vote strategically, i.e. they do take into consideration that their best
option might be out of reach and give support to some least preferred policy.
Incentives to break the law are not considered (suppose the cost of punishment
where on average a vote is called for (on speciﬁc issues) 4 times a year
11is high enough).
3.1 Discussion
The structure of the payoﬀs considered can be better evaluated after discussion
of two simplifying assumptions concerning (i) symmetry, and (ii) homogeneity.
The symmetry of the payoﬀs around 0 poses no problems when looking at
which action is played, since only the ranking is relevant in this case. It does
however aﬀect which policy is voted, and which policy ranking comes out of
social welfare considerations. It would be however easy to accommodate for






Table 2: General payoﬀ matrix. Internal payoﬀ refers to the utility individual
m gets when s/he plays action a. External payoﬀ refers to the externality
individual m receives when another individual plays action a.
This would also allow to explicitly model a taste for diversity, i.e. the case
when agents’ most preferred actions do not coincide with what they would wish
others to do (the rank in terms of the αs might diﬀer from that of the βs).
For the sake of simpliﬁcation I make the assumptions (1) βa = kαa for all
actions a, and (2) α3 = −α1, but it would be easy to accommodate for the
general structure of table 2. Note that assumption (1) does not necessary imply
a preference for conformism, as actions can be appropriately redeﬁned in order
to ﬁt in this simpliﬁed framework. This will be clariﬁed below when discussing
possible applications of the model. The additional normalization α2 = 0 is
innocuous.
As for what concerns point (ii), the assumption that α and β are homoge-
12neous in the population can also be easily relaxed, provided that we are willing
to assume that the individual αm and βm are uncorrelated with the individual
types. Considering heterogeneity in α and β in this case only implies to replace
α and β with their average value ¯ α and ¯ β in eqs. 1–3 below, and β alone with
its average value ¯ β in eqs. 6–12.
Moreover, under the plausible assumption that βm = kαm (whoever has
a bigger α has also a bigger β, and vice versa) heterogeneity changes neither
actions nor votes, since they are not based on interpersonal comparisons.
As a an example of a practical application of the model, consider the case of
rape-induced pregnancies. Suppose the alternatives are (i) abort, (ii) leave the
child for adoption and (iii) keep the child. Any decision is likely to aﬀect not
only the utility of those who take it, but also other people (who might disregard
it on moral grounds, or like it as a signal that the option is truly available), and
which in turn might try to exert an inﬂuence on the choice. Interaction here is
in principle global, the notice of the action being enough to cause a reaction.
A second example is city color plans or, more in general, zoning laws. Spe-
ciﬁc restrictions on house colors or development types (residential, business or
commercial buildings, parks, etc.) are often imposed in many urban areas.
These restrictions might obviously involve either prescriptions or proscriptions.
This example is also well suited to discuss how a taste for diversity could be
accounted for while keeping the simplifying assumption βa = kαa: simply de-
ﬁne one of the available options as “Paint your house a diﬀerent color from your
neighbor’s”.
One more example is dressing code. France for instance has passed in 2004
a law forbidding people holding public oﬃces and scholars to show oﬀ religious
signs (such as the Muslim veil, the Jewish kippah, etc.). The ban, which was
promoted to foster integration and ﬁght integralism, has prompted a wide debate
13and a ﬁerce opposition, inside and outside France, exactly on grounds of being
illiberal. However, stronger prescriptions, like wearing school uniforms, are usual
in many countries (as in British schools).
Finally, note that α = 0 16 implies individuals either don’t have or cannot
predict any consequence from their actions to their own utility. As an example,
consider the case of you getting to know that your best friend’s girlfriend has
a relationship with some other guy. What should you do? You can either tell
your friend, or speak with his girlfriend, perhaps speak with the other guy, or
say nothing (which is by the way diﬀerent from not interacting at all). In either
case the well being of your friend is going to be aﬀected (β > 0). What’s most,
you will probably not know how your friend would like you to behave: asking
him being equivalent to telling him the truth.
4 Social welfare
Purely altruistic individuals with α = 0 would choose their action by consid-
ering some prior about the distribution of types P. On the other hand, selﬁsh
individuals with α > 0 would always play their preferred action, if possible.
If this is not allowed, they would choose their second best option, and only if
forced to they would play their least preferred action.
The individual expected payoﬀs under diﬀerent policies are reported in the
Appendix. The corresponding expressions for the social welfare are simply ob-
tained by multiplying the expected payoﬀs for each individual type by the rel-
ative frequency of that type, and then summing up.
Under the Null policy, the expected social welfare associated to the action
of one random individual in the population is:
16as in [Richiardi, 2006]
14π0 = α + βn[
(p1 + p2)(p1 + p2 − p3 − p5)
+ (p3 + p4)(p3 + p4 − p1 − p6)
+ (p5 + p6)(p5 + p6 − p2 − p4)]
(1)
To see why, consider the case of a type 1 or type 2 individual (they both love
A). Without restrictions they will always play A, and get α for themselves. In
addition, they will cause a payoﬀ of β in (p1 +p2)n individuals, and a payoﬀ of
−β in (p3 + p5)n individuals. Note that the probability of choosing randomly
a type 1 or type 2 individual is (p1 + p2). The expected outcomes for the case
when B or C are played account for the remaining terms.
Second, let’s suppose a prescription is imposed. To ﬁx ideas, consider the
case when A is law. The expected payoﬀ for an active player will be πA,active =
(p1 + p2 − p3 − p5)α, while s/he will cause an expected payoﬀ πA,passive =
(p1 + p2 − p3 − p5)β to any of the n passive players s/he is interacting with.
Hence:
πA = (α + βn)(p1 + p2 − p3 − p5) (2)
The expressions for the case when B or C becomes compulsory easily follow.
Third, let’s consider the case of a ban. To ﬁx ideas, focus on the case when
C is forbidden. The corresponding expression for social welfare is:
π ¯ C = α(p1 + p2 + p3 + p4)
+ βn(p1 + p2 + p6)(p1 + p2 − p3 − p5)
+ βn(p3 + p4 + p5)(p3 + p4 − p1 − p6)
(3)
All individuals but those who like C are able to do what they prefer. This
accounts for the ﬁrst term. Those who play A (type 1 and 2 plus type 6, who
15Figure 1: Best policies. Each point is the probability, for an unknown under-
lying preference conﬁguration, that a speciﬁc policy is socially optimal. The
probabilities may sum to less than 1 because for speciﬁc preference conﬁgura-
tions diﬀerent policy types may lead to the same level of social welfare. No
winner is assigned in this case.
have to play their second choice) cause positive externalities in type 1 and type
2 individuals, and negative externalities in type 3 and type 5 individuals (second
term). Those who play B (type 3 and 4 plus type 5, who have to play their
second choice) cause positive externalities in type 3 and type 4 individuals,
and negative externalities in type 1 and type 6 individuals (third term). The
expressions for the case when A or B become outlaw involve but straightforward
modiﬁcations.
Comparing 6 diﬀerent policies (3 prescriptions, 3 bans) plus the Null for
any possible distribution of individual preferences and any combination of α,
β and n proves a diﬃcult task analytically. Instead, I have normalized α to 1
and simulated the outcomes by letting each pt, t = 1,...,6 and βn change by
increasing steps of .05. This leads to the evaluation of 5,440,115 diﬀerent cases.
The results are summarized in ﬁgure 1.
Supposing no priors about the distribution of preferences in the population,
from a social point of view it is better not to impose any restriction whatsoever
16on individual behavior if the overall level of externalities (the externality pro-
duced by an action, multiplied by the number of people aﬀected) are not too
high (βn < 2.25α). Bans are the most likely optimal policy if the overall level of
externalities is between 2.25 and 3.25 times the level of internal (self-generated)
utility, and prescriptions are the most likely optimal policy if the overall level
of externalities is above 3.25 times the level of internal utility.
4.1 Discussion
The analysis of the previous paragraph suggests to look at a measure of total
externalities, βn. Other things being equal, increasing the number of persons af-
fected by the action would thus increase the likelihood that it is socially optimal
to intervene.
In the abortion example passive players might well be very numerous; how-
ever, β is likely to be very small with respect to α. In the case of zoning laws
α is probably smaller but the number of people n aﬀected by the action is also
smaller.
Prescriptions are optimal only when a large number of people love a given
action, but still there is a minority that would otherwise choose some other
action, and the (negative) externalities from this minority are relevant. For
instance, if βn = α = 1 and the type distribution is p1 = .55;p2 = .25;p3 =
0;p4 = .1;p5 = 0;p6 = .1 prescribing A becomes optimal: 80% of the population
loves A, however the remaining 20% of people would choose actions that the
majority dislikes. However, in this case the gain over the Null policy is quite
limited (+2.56%), and the gain over imposing a ban on B (which is disliked by
65% of the population) even more so (only +0.31%).
To see this in more general terms, it is convenient to represent the distribu-
tion of preferences in the society as a single point in a three dimensional space,
17where the axes are labeled a, b and c. The a coordinate is found by counting all
individuals who love A, and subtracting all individuals who hate A. The result
is then normalized to the size of the population. Similarly for the other two
coordinates. 17 Hence,
a = p1 + p2 − p3 − p5
b = p3 + p4 − p1 − p6
c = p5 + p6 − p2 − p4
(4)
and a + b + c = 0.
Note that diﬀerent distributions of preferences can lead to the same point
in the space. For instance, the point in the origin is given not only by p1 =
p2 = p3 = p4 = p5 = p6 = 1
6, but by any combination of preferences such that
p1 = p3;p2 = p5;p4 = p6. We can now deﬁne the extent to which preferences
are homogeneous as the distance from the center of the sphere:
d(a,b,c) ≡ d(p1,··· ,p6) =
p
a2 + b2 + c2 (5)
Note that d ∈ [0,
√
2] : all points lie inside a sphere around the origin. In
the center of the sphere preferences are more fragmented; on the surface they
are more unanimous.
Figure 2 shows that (i) for a given level of the externalities, the higher the
level of homogeneity d in the population the higher is the likelihood that it is
optimal to intervene with a more coercive policy (ﬁrst bans, then prescriptions),
and (ii) the higher the level of externalities the lower is the level of homogeneity
when it is likely to become optimal to intervene.















































Figure 2: Probability, averaged over preference conﬁgurations that lead to the
same distance measure d, that a ban (left panel) or a prescription (right panel)
is optimal, for three diﬀerent values of βn. The spikes are due to the fact
that, given the speciﬁc grid chosen for exploring the space of possible preference
distributions, some values of d can be produced by more combinations, while
others by less combinations, and some others cannot be produced at all. By
decreasing the value of the step smoother ﬁgures are obtained.
5 Binary agenda
When comparing only two policy options strategic voting is not an issue, and
rational individuals will always support the alternative that brings them higher
utility, as reported in the Appendix. However, due to the multi-dimensional
character of the model pairwise comparison of policy alternatives (binary agenda)
leads to policy cycles: for any given policy, an alternative can generally be found
that will get the majority support. Thus, a majority will ask for a referendum
on the alternative, and will win it.
A typical policy transition matrix is reported in table 3, where each cell (i,j)
contains the share of the voters supporting policy j against policy i. A switch
to the new policy takes place whenever the value in the corresponding cell is
above .5 (bold values).
In the example, A will never be implemented; the Null and No A policies
are on the other hand quite likely, since they can be defeated only by No A and
19t + 1
t Null No A No B No C A B C
Null .56 .47 .44 .32 .41 .27
No A .44 .47 .44 .32 .53 .47
No B .53 .53 .53 .44 .41 .56
No C .56 .56 .47 .47 .53 .27
A .68 .68 .56 .53 .53 .56
B .59 .47 .59 .47 .47 .47
C .73 .53 .44 .73 .44 .53
Table 3: Policy transition matrix: each cell (i,j) reports the share of the voters
supporting policy j against policy i. Bold values indicate that the transition
takes place. Preferences are p1 = .20;p2 = .12;p3 = .29;p4 = .12;p5 = .12;p6 =
.15. Payoﬀs are α = βn = 1.
B, respectively.
Note that if policy i is defeated against policy j it cannot be the case that
in a subsequent vote the outcome is reversed: the sum of any two symmetric
cells must be 1.
5.1 Replacement of bans with obligations
It is interesting to note that a majority can always be found to replace a speciﬁc
ban with an appropriate prescription, but the reverse is not necessarily true.
To see this suppose without loss of generality a ban on playing C is in place.
Straightforward comparison of the individual payoﬀs under the diﬀerent policies
reported in the Appendix shows that types 1, 2 and 6 will be in favor of replacing
it with an obligation to play A, while types 3, 4 and 5 would oppose the change.
Thus, if p1 + p2 + p6 > p3 + p4 + p5 the ban is replaced with an obligation
to play A. However, if this is not the case and p1 + p2 + p6 < p3 + p4 + p5 a
new absolute majority is found to replace the ban with an obligation to play
B. Note that this is true irrespective of the values of α, β and n. 18 Hence, in
pairwise comparisons an appropriate prescription can always be found to replace
18Of course for some preference distributions a prescription to play C might also be preferred
to the ban.
20a speciﬁc ban.
Now, suppose again without loss of generality that a prescription to play
A is in place. By comparing the diﬀerent individual incentives reported in the
Appendix we observe that:
• support will be found to switch to No B if p3 + p5 + p6 > .5;
• support will be found to switch to No C if p3 + p4 + p5 > .5;
• when A is confronted with No A, type 1 and 2 individuals will oppose the
change, while type 3 and 5 will support it; type 4 will be in favor only if
α+βn(−p1 +p2 +p3 +p4 −p5 −p6) > 0, and type 6 will be in favor only
if α + βn(p1 − p2 − p3 − p4 + p5 + p6) > 0.
Numerical evaluation of all possible preference combinations obtained by
letting again each pt change by increasing steps of .05 in [0,1], and βn change
by increasing steps of .05 in [0,2] shows a change to a ban will happen only in
64.47% of the cases. In other words, in pairwise comparisons it is not always
true that an appropriate ban can be found to replace a speciﬁc prescription.
6 Full Agenda
Let’s now turn to the case when all policy options are jointly evaluated (full
agenda). Individuals are asked to vote for the policy they prefer: if no majority
for any ban or prescription is found, the Null policy remains in place. It is trivial
to see that the best (non-strategic) choice is to support an obligation prescribing
to do one’s own most preferred action. Thus, if max(p1+p2,p3+p4,p5+p6) < .5
no policy is implemented; alternatively, a prescription is put in place (see table
4).
As already discussed, enlarging the set of possible alternatives provides
strong incentives for strategic voting. In the framework of the present model,
21Policy Supported by
A p1 + p2
B p3 + p4
C p5 + p6
Table 4: Support for prescriptions, full agenda
a non trivial question is whether such a behavior leads to an increased support
for bans or the Null policy.
To investigate this issue I adopt the following mechanism of strategic voting:
individuals vote for the option that brings them higher expected payoﬀs; they
compute these expected payoﬀs by discounting the payoﬀs they get under each
policy by the probability of that policy being enacted; they hold adaptive ex-
pectations on this probability based on the results of the last vote. In addition,
to allow for more strategy exploration each voter is assumed to vote randomly
with probability r. 19
This simple mechanism has some (emergent) pleasant properties. First of
all, the number of non-sincere voters decreases with the size of the population,
the outcome correspondingly approaches the result under non-strategic voting.
Moreover, as the size of the population increases strategic voting is increasingly
targeted at supporting the second most popular policy option. That is, as
individuals realize it is more and more diﬃcult to aﬀect the outcome of the vote,
some stop playing strategically and turn back to sincere preference revelation,
while some others join their eﬀorts and focus their support on the most likely
alternative.
The implications of this voting strategy are analyzed by means of an agent-
based simulation. 20
19Varying this parameter however only aﬀects the speed of convergence and the stability of
the stationary state, a higher speed (a higher value of r) leading to a more perturbed outcome.
20The simulation is written in Java and makes use of JAS simula-
tion platform [Sonnessa, 2004]. The code can be downloaded from
http://utenti.dea.univpm.it/richiardi/code/Bans.rar or requested to the author.
22Figure 3: Simulation schedule
The schedule of the simulation is reported in ﬁgure 3. The number of agents,
N, is set to 100. The experimentation probability r is set to .1.
The ﬁrst thing to note is that this voting strategy does not lead to policy
cycles. Some distribution of preferences may lead to very close races, and due
to the fraction of random voters policy switches are indeed observed; however,
as soon as randomness is removed stability is obtained. Figure 4 exempliﬁes
this.
As ﬁgure 4 shows, convergence, i.e. stationarity of the vote shares is imme-
diately achieved if the population size is bigger than a handful of agents. Even
with N < 10 players convergence generally takes place within 300 periods. To
allow for such situations in the analysis that follows each simulation run lasts
for 500 periods (500 election rounds), and only the outcome of the last election
is recorded. 32,000 simulation runs are performed, for diﬀerent values of the
population size N ∈ {5,10,··· ,40,100}. In each run preferences (i.e. types)
are assigned randomly, while βn is randomly extracted from {.2,.4,.6,.8,1}.
Hence, according to the results of section 4 we are in a region where the socially
optimal policy is anarchy. For the sake of brevity only outcomes for values of
23Figure 4: Probabilistic voting. One single simulation run consisting of 50
periods. Population size is 100, with the following preference distribution:
p1 = .20;p2 = .11;p3 = .18;p4 = .17;p5 = .34;p6 = 0. α = 1;βn = 1.
r = .1 in the ﬁrst 25 periods; r = 0 in the last 25 periods.
βn ∈ {.2,1} are reported.
Table 5 shows that the number of strategic voters in the population decreases
as the population size increases, to reach a ﬂoor at about 45%, irrespective of the
values of β and n. However, the share of the population that votes strategically
in favor of a minority policy option increases. This is also shown in table 6,
where the fraction of strategic voters supporting each policy (ranked from the
most to the least voted) is reported. As N increases and the winning policy
becomes less and less inﬂuenced by strategic voting, those individuals who still
ﬁnd attractive to play strategically do it in order to aﬀect the choice of the most
relevant alternative.
Note that these two characteristics of the speciﬁc probabilistic voting mech-
anism used in this paper are emergent phenomena, and could not easily be
predicted knowing only the individual voting rule.
Finally, table 7 reports the outcomes of the electoral contest. Anarchy and
bans have no chance of being implemented as soon as the population size grows
over 30 individuals, and prescriptions are always voted. As expected, higher
values of the externality parameter β and of the number of aﬀected people n
24Strategic Voting with:
N voters majority minority Obs.
βn = .2
5 .74 .63 .11 832
10 .74 .61 .13 619
15 .63 .46 .18 774
20 .55 .31 .23 570
25 .49 .25 .24 815
30 .47 .22 .25 753
35 .46 .21 .24 793
40 .45 .21 .25 790
100 .46 .21 .25 501
βn = 1
5 .64 .50 .14 742
10 .62 .44 .18 622
15 .50 .27 .23 795
20 .47 .22 .24 620
25 .45 .21 .24 787
30 .44 .21 .24 768
35 .45 .21 .24 840
40 .45 .21 .24 784
100 .44 .20 .25 512
Table 5: Fraction of strategic voters in the population
lead to a higher frequency of implementation of prescriptions even when the
population size is (very) small.
6.1 Discussion
I have shown that when all policy options are jointly considered non-strategic
behavior always leads to some prescription being selected. Strategic behavior
could in principle change this outcome, but I have shown that in reality, except
for decisions involving only a small number of agents, this never happens.
Of course, bargaining might totally internalize the externality problem and
allow a recovery of the socially eﬃcient outcome. However, the possibility to
agree on side payments on voting decisions are limited, if not explicitly prohib-
ited by the law.
25Fraction of strategic voters
supporting policy ranked:
N 1 2 3 4 Obs
βn = .2
5 .73 .14 .06 .00 832
10 .72 .19 .07 .01 619
15 .60 .23 .10 .05 774
20 .48 .27 .16 .06 570
25 .44 .29 .17 .06 815
30 .42 .29 .18 .06 753
35 .41 .29 .18 .07 793
40 .40 .30 .18 .07 790
100 .40 .30 .19 .05 501
βn = 1
5 .66 .19 .08 .00 742
10 .60 .24 .11 .03 622
15 .47 .29 .15 .07 795
20 .41 .30 .17 .08 620
25 .43 .28 .18 .07 787
30 .41 .29 .19 .08 768
35 .41 .29 .18 .07 840
40 .41 .28 .19 .07 784
100 .39 .29 .20 .05 512
Table 6: Fraction of strategic voters supporting policy ranked 1 ... 4. Policy
ranked 1 is the winner. Data on policies ranked 5 and 6 are not reported because
the supporting fraction is very small.
The fact that individuals are not able to coordinate on a socially better out-
come reﬂects a sort of “race to the bottom” in the voting process: as individuals
understand that others might coordinate on voting an obligation that is odious
to them, they react by voting another (less odious) obligation.
7 Conclusions
In this paper I have developed a simple model of social interaction, where in-
dividual actions have (positive or negative) externalities on the well being of
others, and individuals are allowed to vote by majority ruling for a ban or a
prescription. Assuming no compensations among individuals are contractable
26Outcomes (%)
N Null Bans Prescriptions Sum Obs
βn = .2
5 .41 .24 .35 1 832
10 .34 .37 .28 1 619
15 .22 .23 .54 1 774
20 .09 .11 .81 1 570
25 .04 .04 .92 1 815
30 .01 .01 .98 1 753
35 .00 .00 1.00 1 793
40 .00 .00 1.00 1 790
100 .00 .00 1.00 1 501
βn = 1
5 .24 .24 .53 1 742
10 .11 .34 .55 1 622
15 .01 .11 .87 1 795
20 .00 .02 .97 1 620
25 .00 .00 1.00 1 787
30 .00 .00 1.00 1 768
35 .00 .00 1.00 1 840
40 .00 .00 1.00 1 784
100 .00 .00 1.00 1 512
Table 7: Strategic outcomes
the social optimum is to place no restrictions on individual behavior if total
externalities are low enough, and impose a ban on some speciﬁc action if total
externalities are higher. Prescriptions are optimal only when a large number of
people has a preference over a given action, but still there is a minority that
would otherwise choose some other action, and the (negative) externalities from
this minority are relevant.
I then turned to private incentives to vote. In pairwise competition policy
cycles naturally arise, but if individuals have to choose among all possible bans
and prescriptions, the latter always prevail under sincere voting. Except for the
case when voting involves only a limited number (< 30) of agents this result is
also robust to strategic voting.
Thus, the answers to the questions in the title are: yes, we would be better oﬀ
27in restricting the number of prescriptions that force individual behavior in favor
of more bans, which clearly identify harmful actions; however no, it is unlikely
that this could be achieved by majority ruling, given that self-interested voters
will tend to support positive obligations. Put diﬀerently and more provocatively,
a liberal state cannot be directly and liberally enforced. This result stresses the
importance of constitutions as a way to provide eﬃcient frameworks for policy
discussion.
28A Individual payoﬀs for diﬀerent policy options
In the following, expected payoﬀs from a cycle of random interactions where
all individuals play once are reported, for all diﬀerent types of individuals and
under each policy. Types are indexed as in table 1. Thus, each individual plays
once as the active player, and on average n times as a passive player.
I assume that, at any moment in time, all agents are equally likely to act.
Hence, the expected payoﬀs from just one random interaction, where an individ-
ual of type t has a probability 1/N of being the active player and a probability
n/N of being the passive player is just πt = Πt/N.
A.1 Null policy
Π1 = α + βn(p1 + p2 − p3 − p4)
Π2 = α + βn(p1 + p2 − p5 − p6)
Π3 = α + βn(p3 + p4 − p1 − p2)
Π4 = α + βn(p3 + p4 − p5 − p6)
Π5 = α + βn(p5 + p6 − p1 − p2)
Π6 = α + βn(p5 + p6 − p3 − p4)
(6)
A.2 Prescription to play A
Π1 = α + βn
Π2 = α + βn
Π3 = −α − βn
Π4 = 0
Π5 = −α − βn
Π6 = 0
(7)
29A.3 Prescription to play B
Π1 = −α − βn
Π2 = 0
Π3 = α + βn
Π4 = α + βn
Π5 = 0
Π6 = −α − βn
(8)
A.4 Prescription to play C
Π1 = 0
Π2 = −α − βn
Π3 = 0
Π4 = −α − βn
Π5 = α + βn
Π6 = α + βn
(9)
A.5 Ban on A
Π1 = 0 + βn(−p2 − p3 − p4)
Π2 = 0 + βn(−p1 − p5 − p6)
Π3 = α + βn(p2 + p3 + p4)
Π4 = α + βn(−p1 + p2 + p3 + p4 − p5 − p6)
Π5 = α + βn(p1 + p5 + p6)
Π6 = α + βn(p1 − p2 − p3 − p4 + p5 + p6)
(10)
A.6 Ban on B
Π1 = α + βn(p1 + p2 + p4)
Π2 = α + βn(p1 + p2 − p3 + p4 − p5 − p6)
Π3 = 0 + βn(−p1 − p2 − p4)
Π4 = 0 + βn(−p3 − p5 − p6)
Π5 = α + βn(−p1 − p2 + p3 − p4 + p5 + p6)
Π6 = α + βn(p3 + p5 + p6)
(11)
30A.7 Ban on C
Π1 = α + βn(p1 + p2 − p3 − p4 − p5 + p6)
Π2 = α + βn(p1 + p2 + p6)
Π3 = α + βn(−p1 − p2 + p3 + p4 + p5 − p6)
Π4 = α + βn(p3 + p4 + p5)
Π5 = 0 + βn(−p1 − p2 − p6)
Π6 = 0 + βn(−p3 − p4 − p5)
(12)
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